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Philosophy in International Relations: 
A Scientific Realist Approach
Jonathan Joseph1
How Does Scientific Realism Relate to International Relations?   
The first question that most people interested in this forum will want to 
ask is; can we develop a specifically scientific realist school of IR? To get 
any disappointment out of the way so that we can move on to alternative 
questions, the short answer is no. Scientific realism is not a theory. In 
the main, I will draw on Marxism for my theoretical examples, while 
employing scientific realism to critically examine Marxist and other 
theoretical claims. Of course, scientific realism can be put to work on 
a range of different theories, although I find its relationship to Marxist 
theory the most convincing. What should be clearly stated, however, 
is that unless we want to change what we understand by scientific 
realism, we cannot meaningfully speak of a scientific realist theory of 
international politics.
This should not come as a surprise. When we talk of a realist theory 
of politics we immediately think of a substantive set of arguments related 
to the nature of politics and political activity that lays emphasis on the 
role of the state, power politics, self-interest, anarchy of the international 
system, and so on. This is a very different type of realism from the one 
we wish to develop here and when asked about the difference between 
political realism and scientific realism we inevitably find ourselves 
saying that they deal with different things or subject matters, one being a 
political theory or school, the other a philosophical approach that argues 
for the independent existence of reality, separate from our attempts to 
explain or understand it. If we are so quick to make this distinction 
between theory and philosophy when asked whether scientific realism is 
related to political realism, why should we suddenly wish to abandon it 
and claim that scientific realism can also become a theory of IR?
Scientific realism, therefore, is a philosophical position. In the 
simplest sense, realism means a belief in the independent existence 
of reality. In the line-up of different philosophical positions realism 
stands against idealist, hermeneutic, most constructivist and most 
poststructuralist philosophical positions on this issue.2 Those approaches 
that draw on or are influenced by positivism, by contrast, may possibly 
____________
1. Thanks to Doug Stokes, David Leon, Silviya Lechner and the referees for 
helpful comments. All the mistakes are mine.
2. Insofar as constructivism believes that the (social) world is socially constructed 
and is bound up with our beliefs and understandings. Poststructuralism argues 
that we can only know the world through the ‘text’ or particular discourses. 
Whether there is a ‘real world’ beyond this is a matter of little consequence.
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be described as ‘empirical realist’ insofar as they believe that there is a 
real world ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered. Political or IR realism, 
therefore, might be considered realist in a philosophical sense as well. 
However, we might distinguish between the empirical realism of 
these positions and the scientific realism being advocated here in the 
following way. Empirical realism (which underpins realist, neorealist and 
neoliberal institutionalist theories of IR) only admits of the existence of a 
reality that can be directly observed. Scientific realism, by contrast, posits 
the existence of unobservable structures and generative mechanisms. It 
argues that empirical realist or positivist approaches that deny that we 
can talk of such structures3 inevitably paint a picture of an atomistic 
world with no necessary underlying relations and indeed a significantly 
weakened basis for making causal claims of any kind.
So first we have distinguished scientific realism from theoretical 
approaches such as IR realism. Scientific realism, in contrast to the 
different theories of IR, is a philosophy not a theory, producing 
second-order, conceptual or meta-theoretical claims. Second, we have 
distinguished scientific realism from other philosophical positions that 
are influential in IR, such as constructivism and poststructuralism, on the 
basis of the belief in a reality independent of the knowledge we have of 
it (the former positions conflate the ontological status of reality with the 
epistemological issue of the knowledge we have of that reality4). Finally, 
we can distinguish scientific realism from the philosophical positions 
that underpin mainstream IR theories insofar as scientific realism goes 
beyond empirical realism in positing the reality of unobservable and 
underlying structures, processes, generative mechanisms and causal 
relations. What scientific realism brings to IR, therefore, is a philosophical 
argument concerning the epistemological stance and ontological 
assumptions of the various theories and approaches. While not being 
a theory of IR in its own right, it can criticise some of the assumptions 
of different theories by examining their philosophical underpinnings, 
while offering support to alternative theories by strengthening their 
ontological and epistemological claims. In particular, scientific realism 
is notable for taking a strong ontological stance, insisting on the need 
to move from disputes over knowledge claims to an investigation of 
the independently existing things that these claims are about (indeed 
this is the only way to understand such disputes). This approach can 
be defined as transcendental realism in that it shifts attention to that 
which must be the case for knowledge to be possible in the first place. 
Thus scientific realism focuses on the independently existing reality that 
knowledge tries to comprehend. It also draws attention to the ontological 
consequences of theoretical claims in terms of what they imply about the 
nature of the world. We will see how scientific realism might be used 
____________
3. For example, Popper’s demarcation criteria.
4. Of course this can be either implicit or explicit depending on how reality is 
defined. The hermeneutic tradition would argue that knowledge and reality are 
one and the same.
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to question reified and atomistic (neorealist) or idealist (constructivist) 
views of international relations. In the next section we will look at the 
ontological consequences of neorealist arguments, before moving on to 
the constructivist alternative. As mentioned, the main focus will be on 
ontological issues, in particular, social stratification, the nature of material 
and ideational entities and the question of structure and agency.
Some Specific Ways in which Scientific Realism might Engage in 
Debates about the Ontology of International Relations
We will start with a brief discussion of the influence and consequences of 
positivism in IR. It is probably best to leave aside debates about whether 
the classical realists were positivists or not. Part of the problem is that the 
term is now used so indiscriminately in IR that a positivist has become 
anyone who is not a post-positivist. One thing for sure though is that it is 
easier to pin the term positivist to Waltz’s work.
Waltz’s Theory of International Politics clearly makes assumptions 
of a positivist nature when arguing that scientific laws are based on the 
relations between variables along the lines of if a then b with probability 
x.5 Waltz adds that theories differ from laws in showing why these 
associations obtain: in other words, theories explain laws.6 We find 
Waltz arguing that ‘first, one must conceive of international politics as 
a bounded realm or domain; second, one must discover some law-like 
regularities within it; and third, one must develop a way of explaining 
the observed regularities’.7 The ontological consequences of this 
approach can be found in the familiar statements that ‘The texture of 
international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events 
repeat themselves endlessly … The enduring anarchic character of 
international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of 
international life through the millennia’.8 In other words, Waltz’s world 
lacks any social or historical specificity.
Like other positivists, Waltz embraces atomistic assumptions, in 
this case about states being the basic units and ‘structure’ comprising 
external relations between units. For all the talk that one should focus on 
the relation of unit to structure rather than interactions among the units, 
the structure is ultimately nothing more than precisely these interactions. 
Wendt is right to call Waltz an individualist.9 He models his system on 
neoclassical micro-economic theory where individual interaction is key. 
Structural questions are no more than the arrangements of the parts of 
a system. In the international system each part is formally the equal of 
____________





9. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 15.
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another.10 Ultimately the system is a product of individual behaviour 
that Waltz assumes to be based on self-help or egotistical views. Thus the 
neorealist conception of structure is based on stable patterns of aggregate 
behaviour ultimately traceable to micro-level behavioural patterns.
The effect of this analysis is typical of any number of positivist 
approaches – that is to say, to naturalise a reified view of the social world 
(in this case its international system) and to hide the real nature of the 
international system by focusing on recurring relations between formally 
equal units. International politics is about discovering and explaining law-
like regularities.11 Even if we were to accept the argument about law-like 
regularities (which we should not), there is no possibility of conceiving 
of any underlying processes that produce them. Put in scientific realist 
terms, Waltz embraces an actualist philosophy that focuses at the level 
of events, but ignores the level of the real – those unobservable social 
structures, causal processes and generative mechanisms that produce 
the events. Unless IR theory is to switch attention to the level of the 
real, there is little possibility of saying anything about the specificity of 
international relations. Rather, as Cox points out12, neorealist and other 
mainstream approaches to IR merely ‘problem solve’ within an already 
predefined and limited field of analysis while leaving to one side real 
questions of social analysis. Consequently, such approaches reinforce 
the status quo and naturalise the relationships they describe, rather than 
critically questioning their underlying social basis.
Positivism is not an epistemology as such. It is a philosophy with 
both epistemological and ontological implications. The ontological 
implications are borne out in some theories of IR. For example, 
positivism’s assumption of atomism finds its ontological consequences 
in realist claims that the state is the basic unit of international relations 
and the levels of analysis argument that International Relations is about 
studying the external relations between states. As critical theory (as 
early as Horkheimer and Adorno) will argue, this is a reified view of the 
world that turns its back on underlying social relations. Of course, this 
reified view of the world may be a necessary simplification, but it is one 
that has consequences thanks to the epistemic fallacy of conflating such 
regularities with the real nature of the world itself, for the ‘scientific’ 
wave of realists would admit of nothing else – history, philosophy, 
human psychology, diplomatic writings and other ‘traditional’ 
approaches. This is also an assumption that the world can be talked 
about without reference to values, reasons or ideological factors. The fact 
– value distinction is not just about how to study international relations, 
but what to study or to make it more ontologically obvious, what there 
is of consequence out there that IR should concern itself with. This point 
is raised by Hedley Bull’s contribution to the Second Debate, although 
the ontological consequences of this should be pushed much further. 
____________
10. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 88.
11. Ibid., 116.
12. Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 10, no.1(1981):  126–55.
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The Second Debate is considered a methodological debate over the way 
‘phenomena should be studied’.13 But if we take up Bull’s point that 
the ‘scientific approach’ is ‘unable to develop any feeling either for the 
play of international politics or for the moral dilemmas to which it gives 
rise’14, this is because the ‘scientific’ approach ignores the reality of such 
things, that international politics is ontologically much more than what 
the supposedly scientific laws refer to15.
The ontological implications of positivist assumptions can be seen 
in most aspects of realist, neorealist and other ‘rationalist’ theories of IR. 
Since the debate over levels of analysis, initiated by Singer in 1961 and 
reinforced by Waltz’s work, we can see more clearly how mainstream 
IR is underpinned by positivist assumptions about rational behaviour, 
taking states as the (atomistic) units of analysis, employing a billiard-
ball model of state interaction, focusing on regularities and predictable 
outcomes, and generally presenting a reified social ontology that excludes 
underling structures, causal mechanisms or constitutive processes.
So if we are to summarise this section, the first thing that scientific 
realism can bring to IR is a clearer understanding of the ontological 
implications of positivism and other philosophical positions – something 
that is often denied or obscured. It is common to see such issues as 
‘methodological’ issues, such as is the case with the Second Debate, 
when in fact such debates have important ontological implications about 
what the world itself is like (as well as how it should be studied). Often 
positivism is talked of by IR theorists as if it is merely a methodology (for 
analysing the world) rather than having its own ontological assumptions 
about what the world itself is like. For example, a recent (very good) 
introduction to IR theory argues that positivism is a methodology, 
but then goes on to say that positivism views the world ‘as having 
regularities and patterns that can be explained if the correct methodology 
is properly applied’.16 This is tautological – positivism is a methodology 
that demands the correct methodology (itself). To correct this, we should 
say that positivism is a philosophical position that makes ontological 
assumptions about the world as comprising patterns and regularities 
that can be explained by the correct methodology. It is easy to see why 
the confusion arises, however. For positivism starts from the way it 
thinks the world should be studied, theoretically creating the artificial 
____________
13. K. Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau, Contending Approaches to International 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 4. Martin Hollis and Steve 
Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1990), 31.
14. Hedley Bull, ‘International Theory: A Case for a Classical Approach’ in 
Knorr and Rosenau, Contending Approaches to International Politics, 20–38, 28.
15. Indeed, returning to our earlier point about classical realism, this same 
argument might be found in embryo in Morgenthau’s Scientific Man Versus Power 
Politics (Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1967), a book at odds with the more positivistic 
elements of Politics among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1985).
16. Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 238.
Millennium
350
Philosophy in International Relations
351
conditions whereby regularities are obtained, then imposing these on the 
world (or more instrumentally, acting ‘as if’ the world were like this). 
This represents the ‘epistemic fallacy’ of confusing the real world with the 
means used to study it. By starting the other way round we can say that 
if the world itself (or the world of international relations) is much more 
than just constant conjunctions of events or empirical phenomena, then 
positivist-inspired theories are inadequate, perhaps even misleading, 
means of explanation.
Constructivism I: Materialism and Idealism
Constructivism appeals to those scholars wishing to avoid the perceived 
mistakes of mainstream ‘positivist’ IR. My argument in the next two 
sections is that this narrow starting point is precisely the problem. In 
a short piece like this it is not possible to develop a detailed critique 
of constructivism. Instead, we will focus on two aspects which have 
important ontological implications – the structure–agency question and 
the idealism–materialism issue.
Constructivism is not a theory of International Relations17. Having 
said this, since most constructivists do not state what their theory of 
IR is, constructivism effectively becomes one. Constructivism makes a 
number of general assumptions that have to be addressed. It is based on a 
social ontology where humans do not exist independently of their social 
environment. But while constructivism rightly claims that the social 
environment constitutes who we are, this is seen in terms of a collectively 
shared system of meanings. Constructivism places emphasis on words, 
language and communication while the structure of the environment 
is seen as comprising rules and obligations. Nicholas Onuf states that 
constructivism begins with deeds, acts and spoken words.18 He conflates 
these and the world itself so that a ‘constructivist view denies that world 
and words are independent; it sees them as mutually constitutive’.19 
For Alexander Wendt, meanwhile, structure should be seen in social 
rather than material terms (Waltz, it is claimed highlights the dangers 
of a materialist approach).20 For Wendt the basis of sociality is shared 
knowledge, hence he claims to take an idealist view of structure.21 Wendt 
sees structure and structural change in cultural terms – again something 
seen as lacking in mainstream IR theory.
____________
17. Wendt, Social Theory, 7.
18. Onuf, World of Our Making, 36.
19. Ibid., 94.
20. Dessler is quite right to point out that social and material do not stand in 
opposition and that the opposite of social is natural while the opposite of material 
is immaterial (David Dessler, ‘Constructivism within a Positivist Social Science’, 
Review of International Studies, 25, no.1 (1999): 123–137, 127 although it would 
seem that Wendt often has immaterial or ideational in mind when he uses the 
term social.
21. Wendt, Social Theory, 1, 20.
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So what should we make of Wendt’s claim that the structure of society 
is constituted by ideas rather than material forces?22 It will be argued 
here that Wendt is right to argue that structures are not just material 
processes, but wrong to go in the opposite direction and claim that they 
are therefore ideational because they are social or cultural. Scientific 
realists try to get past this material–ideational question by insisting 
instead that structures – as underlying processes – are real and have real 
causal effects. They would agree that the ideational aspect of structures is 
important but would also point to the significance of the material aspect. 
This is captured in a number of Roy Bhaskar’s formulations of structure. 
For example, he writes that structures are ‘relations of various kinds: 
between people and each other, their products, their activities, nature 
and themselves’.23 This is taken further in Bhaskar’s later model of the 
social cube or four-planar model of social being based on: (1) material 
transactions with nature; (2) interpersonal, intra- or interaction; (3) social 
relations; and (4) intra-subjectivity24.
The materialist emphasis on relations with nature is emphasised 
in Marxist approaches that focus on the centrality of production. This 
need not imply reductionist materialism – as Wendt notes, the Marxist 
notion of production implies relations of production and various 
ideational aspects.25 Production is a social, cultural and political process 
as much as a brute economic relation. Marxist approaches that take this 
position emphasise the importance of social relations of production 
rather than the more limited notion of forces of production. Or to put 
it differently, productive forces cannot be considered independently of 
the social relations that organise them. In the broadest sense, capitalism 
is unimaginable without private property relations and these in turn 
are established through a legal framework guaranteed by political 
sovereignty and an ideational belief in their legitimacy. Wendt’s problem 
is that he notes this but then gets caught up in a critique of the limited 
conception of materialism derived from neorealism when he talks of 
such things as human nature, natural resources, geography, forces of 
production and forces of destruction.26 Materialism gets reduced to 
questions of powers, resources and material capabilities, and the more 
complex and social view of materialism in Marxism and other traditions 
in social theory is forgotten.
The problem is that Wendt tends to reduce materialism to material 
capabilities, a direct consequence of starting from neorealism and Waltz 
rather than from social theory and Marx. Although Wendt does indicate 
the greater sophistication of the Marxist tradition, he still tends to see it 
in a reductionist light. He argues that what makes various approaches 
historical materialist is their ‘pyramid-style approach to thinking about 
____________
22. Ibid., 25.
23. Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality (London: Verso, 1989), 81.
24. Roy Bhaskar, Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom (London: Verso, 1993), 180.




Philosophy in International Relations
353
base and superstructure’ or how ‘material conditions are thought to 
constrain ideas’.27 This claim can only be understood if the ‘base’ is 
interpreted as ‘material base’ and the superstructure as political and 
ideological. But, as mentioned, a Marxist approach that starts from the 
significance of mode of production can reject this kind of determinism 
by stressing how the mode of production contains social relations 
inseparable from political, cultural and ideational factors. Scientific realist 
approaches to Marxism have indeed engaged with exactly these matters 
of the way in which meanings and causal powers of material forces are 
embedded in contingent (or let us say historical) social relations.28
Wendt claims that agents and their interactions are fundamental 
to the causal powers of structure – they are, we could say, the stuff 
that structures are made of and ‘to think otherwise is like thinking that 
the mind exists or has effects apart from the brain’.29 This is confusing 
because of the different ways that reductionism can be understood. If 
we follow Waltz then reductionism is about moving from structures 
to the unit or micro-level of things such as individual interaction. But 
Wendt’s example of the brain can instead be seen as an example of 
materialist reductionism. The reduction of the workings of the mind 
to brain matter might be compared to economic reductionism. But the 
clearest comparison is not the reduction of the social or the economic 
to the micro-level of individual activity as Waltz suggests, but the 
reduction of the social to the economy or the reduction of the economy 
to material forces – Wendt himself mentions the Marxist reduction of 
the social to forces of production. Scientific realists have been keen to 
avoid this kind of reductionism, but their view that the social world is 
stratified still recognises prior levels that higher levels depend upon 
and which may exert strong causal powers. Thus there is no mind 
independent of the physical brain, nor are there international relations 
without economic ones. The point is that the mind has its own emergent 
properties that are irrreducible to those of the brain. The same might be 
said about international relations and the capitalist economy. So if we 
follow through with this understanding, then the result is the opposite 
of what Wendt has been arguing. The mind is clearly not reducible to the 
physical or material properties of the brain – it has its own specificity. 
However, it is also clearly dependent on the brain and the physical 
properties that make thoughts and ideas possible. The closest analogy 
to social structure is to say that interaction, ideas and those things we 
could describe as intersubjective are not reducible to material conditions. 
____________
27. Ibid., 168.
28. I am paraphrasing Wendt here. Alexander Wendt, ‘On the Via Media: A 
Response to the Critics’, Review of International Studies, 26, no.1 (2000): 165–80, 169. 
For scientific realist approaches to Marxism see Andrew Brown, Steve Fleetwood 
and John Michael Roberts (eds), Critical Realism and Marxism (London: Routledge, 
2002), Jonathan Joseph, Marxism and Social Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), 
Kathryn Dean, Jonathan Joseph, John Michael Roberts and Colin Wight, Realism, 
Philosophy and Social Science (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006).
29. Wendt, Social Theory, 146.
Millennium
352
Philosophy in International Relations
353
However, these material conditions are necessary for interactions and 
ideas to be possible. Ideas and interaction exist to material conditions as 
mind exists to brain. The former are emergent and irreducible properties 
of the latter. Agents and their interactions, rather than being fundamental 
to the causal powers of structure as Wendt claims, are actually dependent 
upon the ontologically distinct causal powers of structures, although not 
reducible to them.
To take the issue of materialism further, we might say that the things 
constructivism talks of may be valid. We might say the same thing about 
poststructuralist notions of discursive articulation. But there must be 
something there in the first place to be constructed or articulated. It is 
no good simply saying that nuclear weapons are socially constructed or 
discursively articulated and that prior to this construction or articulation 
they are meaningless physical things (i.e. that it is only through discourse 
that they become meaningful). This merely raises a further question 
– what is it about the physical or material properties of something 
that allows it to lend itself to particular forms of social construction or 
discursive articulation? Not just anything can be articulated as a nuclear 
weapon; it has to have certain material properties. Social construction 
might help explain why a missile is regarded positively as something that 
provides security (as opposed to being a weapon of mass destruction), 
but the physical properties of something, far from being meaningless 
outside discursive articulation, are the very things that make social 
construction possible. Social construction might make certain meanings 
possible, but material conditions make social construction possible. 
While social construction is irreducible to material conditions and it has 
its own powers and dynamics, this should not stop us from recognising 
the way that these conditions both enable and constrain it.
Wendt and other constructivists are so keen to emphasise the 
ideational that they often turn a two-way relationship into a one-way 
one.30 Thus social objects and practices are constructed by ideas. But 
what about the argument that ideas are shaped by objects and practices? 
This latter point is obviously a Marxist materialist one. Indeed one of 
Marxism’s insights is to develop a concept of ideology based on the idea 
that it is generated by various social relations and practices (organised 
social activities). Althusser argues that ideology is secreted by social 
practices. Marx argues that economic practices generate misleading 
____________
30. Elsewhere Wendt rightly says ‘it cannot be ideas all the way down 
because scientific realism shows that ideas are based on and are regulated by an 
independently existing physical reality’, Wendt Social Theory, 110. As Smith notes, 
Wendt shifts his view of the relationship between the material and the ideational. 
Sometimes he admits that social kinds are materially grounded (Wendt, Social 
Theory, 77) yet he also says that material causes are constituted by ideas (ibid., 
94) (Steve Smith, ‘Wendt’s World’ Review of International Studies, 26, no.1 (2000): 
151-63 153-4). It is best to conclude that Wendt’s views here are confused and he 
would do better to move away from the narrow confines of IR theory and clarify 
this relationship in relation to social theory.
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social constructions such as the commodity form or the wage form. 
Thus the purpose of ‘denaturalizing a previously unquestioned object 
or practice’31 is precisely to show that the object or practice might be 
other than its social (ideological) construction suggests. This raises the 
issue of why things get constructed in the way they do. Why are some 
‘constructions’ more powerful than others? What are the conditions 
of possibility for social construction? The Marxist answer to these 
questions, whether one likes it or not, ultimately resides in things like 
mode of production and material conditions. The constructivist answer 
is more difficult to work out.
In summary, the argument against materialism is an argument 
against either a simplistic materialism (neorealism) or a crude, 
reductionist materialism (some forms of Marxism).32 Given all this, 
perhaps the answer to the question of the ontological status of objects, 
ideas, relations and structures is to say that they are all real. Both the 
material and ideational should be conceived in the context of real 
entities that exist independently of our conceptualisation and have real 
powers, liabilities and causal effects. Thus ideational things as much 
as material things can be said to have a real existence independent of 
particular conceptions and understandings we may have of them. This 
is a useful way of understanding the value of postructuralist notions of 
discourse, resisting the temptation to reduce discourse to intersubjective 
understanding – although we would still have to guard against the 
poststructuralist tendency to overstate the significance of discourse.33 
Instead of getting too fixated on what is material and what is ideational 
we should instead adopt Bhaskar’s distinction between the real and the 
irreal. Scientific realism maintains the independent existence of material 
____________
31. Fearon and Wendt ‘Rationalism and Constructivism in International 
Relations Theory’ in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 52-72: 57.  
32. Having said this, most Marxists would laugh at Emanuel Adler’s 
suggestions that materialism takes the world as it is (Adler, ‘Constructivism 
and International Relations’ in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter 
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 95–118: 95). 
This is exactly what Marx argues against in that: ‘The chief defect of all hitherto 
existing materialism … is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only 
in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, 
practice, not subjectively’. Karl Marx ‘First Thesis on Feuerbach’ in Marx Early 
Writings (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 420-23: 421.
33. Of course there are more complex issues to address here. Foucauldian 
approaches to discourse, for example, slide between a distinction between the 
discursive and non-discursive and a view of discourse as embracing both ideas 
and material practices. Derrida’s raising of the issue of what is beyond or outside 
the text is another complex discussion beyond the limits of this article. For 
some discussion of the relation between scientific realism and postructuralism 
see Jonathan Joseph ‘Foucault and Reality’, Capital & Class 82 (2004): 141–63 
and Jonathan Joseph and John Michael Roberts (eds), Realism Discourse and 
Deconstruction (London: Routledge, 2004).
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and ideational entities (for example, both commodities and commodity 
fetishism). Irrealism reduces such entities to the ideas we have of them.34 
Taking this step also allows us to understand the argument raised 
by Patomäki and Wight35 that positivists and post-positivists share a 
common anti-realism in arguing, as Waltz does, that ‘what we think of 
as reality is itself an elaborate conception constructed and reconstructed 
through the ages’.36 This means that positivists and post-positivists alike 
are irrealists if they deny the meaningful, mind-independent, enduring 
nature of these entities. As we shall see in the next section, this is an 
accusation that might be raised in relation to the constructivist conflation 
of structure with the activities and intentions of agents. But although 
this has shifted the discussion somewhat, we can still defend a form of 
materialism, now defined as a belief in the fundamental significance of 
material relations, without us having to say that realism is the belief in 
‘matter all the way down’.
Constructivism II: Structure and Agency
Having briefly discussed the material–ideational aspect of structure, 
we now need to look at how structure is produced or reproduced 
through human agency. Again, it is impossible to do justice to the 
variety of constructivist views so we will have to make do with a few 
selected arguments from Onuf and Wendt. My main argument is that 
their conception of the structure–agency relation is closest to Giddens’ 
structuration model, which sees structures and agents as mutually 
constitutive, thus effectively denying structures causal powers of their 
own. As Wendt puts it, ‘it is impossible for structures to have effects 
apart from the attributes and interactions of agents’.37 For Giddens 
(and following him, for Wendt) structures only ever exist through their 
instantiation.38 They operate only to the extent that certain rules and 
activities are followed by agents (in the present). Following Giddens, 
IR constructivists tend to regard structures as rules and resources rather 
____________
34. Among other things. Irrealism is also denial of complexity, a favouring of 
the present over the absent and a reduction of reality to the actual.
35. Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight, ‘After Postpositivism? The Promises of 
Critical Realism’ International Studies Quarterly, 44, no.2, (2000): 213-37. The realist 
view would also be at odds with Steve Smith’s claim that ‘social phenomena are 
indeed intersubjective and therefore cannot stand in relation to human subjects as 
objects; without this relationship scientific realism cannot operate’ Smith,  Wendt’s 
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37. Wendt, Social Theory, 12.
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than as internal and external social relations.39 Doug Porpora writes that 
for a realist ‘structure refers to the actual organization of society – the 
distribution of income, the division of labor, etc., – whereas for Giddens, 
structure consists of the rules and resources associated with those 
relationships’.40 The scientific realist position such as in Bhaskar, Archer 
and Porpora41 argues that structures and agents possess their own distinct 
properties. Structures are pre-existing features of the world we engage 
with that are relatively enduring and possess powers of enablement and 
constraint. Such a position is evident, if sometimes problematically so, 
in most Marxist theories with their focus on such things as the capital–
labour relation, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall or the logic of 
capital accumulation. These examples illustrate how the causal powers 
of structures are quite distinct from the activities of agents, even if they 
cannot exist without agential activity. Agents, meanwhile, uniquely 
possess the powers of self-consciousness, reflexivity, intentionality, 
cognition and emotionality, things obviously quite distinct from the 
causal powers of structures. Clearly the different properties and powers 
of structures and agents cannot be reduced to one another.
Onuf enters the structure–agency debate on the structurationist side 
as soon as he says that people and societies constitute each other.42 Because 
people make society and society makes people, he suggests that we should 
start in the middle of this relation – that is with the rules that link people and 
society together. Practices are then conceptualised as the making, breaking 
and, more usually, the following of rules.43 When rules and practices 
form stable relations, these are described as institutions. Importantly, 
Onuf allows room for unintended consequences. Rules, institutions and 
unintended consequences together form what Onuf calls structure.44
It is clear that rules and practices are the things doing the work in 
Onuf’s model of society. Indeed, so secondary is the concept of structure 
in Onuf’s work that he advises dropping the term in favour of social 
arrangement – as passive a conception as anything to be found in the 
‘rationalist’ mainstream. For Onuf structure does not exist as deep 
underlying cause, but is a surface thing that ‘observers see’45 and is 
____________
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really not much more than social practice. Clearly most scientific realists 
would have a different conception of structure from this. Rather than 
making rules and practices pivotal, structure would be given much more 
significance as something dynamic, causal, deep-rooted and irreducible 
to agential activities. Rules would be important as part of practices while 
practices would be understood as the mediating factor between structure 
and agents.
Let me run through some of the consequences of this and relate them 
to the previous discussion about materialism. It is not Onuf’s raising of 
the issue of rules that is being questioned here, but rather the fact that 
he gives analytical priority to rules as the mediator between people and 
society. Moreover, by focusing on rules, this inevitably takes a normative 
or ideational turn. Yet this does not do justice to practices since these are 
much more than just norms, ideas and speech acts – they clearly have a 
material aspect to them as well46. Work practices, for example, would 
be meaningless if understood only in normative or ideational terms. 
And this starts to point to the deeper issue of the reproduction and/or 
transformation of the most fundamental of society’s relations. I will 
thus argue that rather than focusing on rules, norms and practices (with 
structure either being reduced to these or derivative of them), we should 
start with social structure, seeing rules, norms and practices as the media 
by which social structures are (largely unintentionally) reproduced and 
occasionally transformed.
Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity argues that 
‘people, in their conscious activity, for the most part unconsciously 
reproduce (and occasionally transform) the structures governing their 
substantial activities of production’.47 Because structures pre-exist agents 
and provide the conditions for human action, they define and limit this 
activity so that the reproduced outcome is usually exactly that – social 
reproduction. It is only under particular circumstances that agents may 
act consciously to change or transform these conditions. And even then, 
this is within the limits defined by the structural context. This is not to 
present the kind of reified structuralist model criticised by Wendt that 
reduces agents to the mere bearers of structures. Although agents usually 
reproduce structures unconsciously or unintentionally, the very fact that 
structures do depend on agents for their reproduction allows for the 
possibility of transformative action. It is just that the transformational 
model insists that we define precisely what the structural possibilities 
and limits of this action are. Thus the transformational model challenges 
the reified view of structuralist and functionalist accounts of social action, 
while resisting the voluntarism of alternative approaches that give free 
reign to human praxis.
____________
46. Material factors are brought in by Onuf – he is in fact better at recognising 
these than many other constructivists. But again, this is not in their own right but 
only through rules so that ‘rules make the world’s material features into resources 
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47. Bhaskar, Possibility of Naturalism, 35.
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While structures depend upon human actions for their reproduction, 
these actions are already conditioned by the structures in a way which 
the actors are seldom aware of. This is not to say that agents do not act 
consciously, but their conscious actions generally are at a surface level 
rather than a deep one. To simplify somewhat, conscious actions take 
place at the level of practices but not of structures. Consequently, agents 
act consciously within practices, the effect of which is the unconscious 
or unintended reproduction of deeper (ontologically distinct) social 
structures. For example, Marxist analysis of the reproduction of capitalist 
society shows how, at the level of social practice, workers consciously 
sell their labour power in return for a wage (although of course workers 
would not consciously see it in these terms). The social practice – of 
going to work to earn a wage – entails a conscious act. When enough 
people do this, the consequence of the practice is the reproduction of 
the capital–labour relationship and other such capitalist structures 
and relations. Clearly the latter is not the conscious intention of most 
workers, yet it is the consequence of millions of people acting upon 
the intention to earn a wage. To give a different example from Bhaskar, 
most people do not marry in order to reproduce the nuclear family, yet 
this is the unintentional consequence of the social practice of marriage48. 
Underlying structures like the family or wage–labour relation depend 
on intersubjective practices but are ontologically distinct from them. 
Moreover, the ideas associated with these practices – the belief, for 
example, that a fair day’s work gets a fair day’s wage – are both 
necessary in relation to the sustainability of the intersubjective practice 
and false in relation to the underlying social relations (of exploitation) 
that these beliefs and practices ultimately sustain. My contention is that 
constructivism cannot deal with such issues because it cannot go beyond 
a social ontology of intersubjective relations or social practices.
It is precisely because structures and agents are ontologically 
distinct that Bhaskar introduces mediating concepts between structure 
and agency. He writes that ‘the mediating system we need is that of the 
positions (places, functions, rules, tasks, duties, rights, etc.) occupied 
(filled, assumed, enacted, etc.) by individuals, and of the practices 
(activities, etc.) in which, in virtue of their occupancy of these positions 
(and vice versa), they engage’.49 The relationship between people and 
society is now understood as mediated through ‘positioned practices’ 
like marriage and work, which collectivise agents and reproduce the 
structures that society comprises through their stratified effects. By 
resolving this problem in scientific realism we can also offer a lifeline 
to constructivist accounts of the social world. Constructivism, rather 
than being dismissed as wrong, might have life as an account of 
positioned practices. These are the more conscious social activities that 
are in turn rooted in deeper structures with unconscious or unintentional 
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‘structures’ are actually positioned practices that have to be conceived of 
as having deeper structures behind them.
Summary
Perhaps it should be emphasised again that this piece is more concerned 
with presenting some arguments for scientific realism rather than 
developing a comprehensive critique of constructivism or IR theory. No 
doubt there are many constructivist arguments that are very different 
from the ones discussed here. But in a sense that is precisely the problem: 
that constructivism lacks a fully consistent and coherent argument. To a 
certain extent this is because IR constructivism is a response to neorealist 
conceptions of structure and materialism, which inevitably means an 
impoverished starting point.
We find a shift from the neorealist conception of structure as stable 
patterns of aggregate behaviour to a constructivist system of shared 
rules that also reduces social structure to an epiphenomenon of human 
behaviour.50 As Porpora argues, approaches based on structuration 
deny the ‘causal significance of objective, social relationships and … the 
analytical priority of those relationships vis-à-vis intersubjective rules, 
norms, ideologies, and symbolic orders’.51 For him, this is the difference, 
then, between social structure as material, and social structure as cultural 
and internal to the collectivity of agents.52
Talking of materialism, if we are to defend such a position, then 
Bhaskar makes a useful set of distinctions. First there is epistemological 
materialism, which upholds the independent existence and transfactual 
activity of some objects of scientific thought. Second is ontological 
materialism, which believes in the dependence of the social upon biological 
and physical being and the emergence (and hence irreducibility) of the 
former from the latter. Third, there is practical materialism concerning 
the constitutive role of human transformative agency.53 Together, these 
present a more subtle and sophisticated version of materialism than the 
one defended by neorealists and attacked by constructivists. Indeed, the 
insights of constructivism can quite happily be incorporated into such a 
framework without making concessions to idealism.
Finally, it should be emphasised again that scientific realism is a 
philosophy or meta-theory. With apologies to those readers expecting a 
piece on IR, the next task is to work out how the above might inform a 
theory of international relations.
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